South Carolina Court of Appeals Approves Prior Restraint
Published April 2025

The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that the “chief purpose of the [First Amendment] guaranty [of free speech] [is] to, prevent previous restraints upon publication.” Restrictions on publication – prior restraints – “are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights” and are “presumptively unconstitutional.” Thus, any party seeking to obtain a prior restraint carries a particularly heavy burden to justify the imposition of such a restraint.
But in a little-noticed decision, in early March a three-judge panel of the South Carolina Court of Appeals unanimously upheld a ban on speech issued by Greenville County family court judge Rochelle Y. Conits barring distribution of the book Soul Pieces: Memoirs of Self-Discovery after Domestic Violence and Divorce on the grounds that it violated the family court’s order restraining the husband and wife in a 2015 divorce decree “against the use of profanity or making any derogatory comments about or toward the other party, or allowing anyone else to do so in front of the [only] child, in any manner whereby the child might learn of the same.”
The wife, Amika T. Clark, published the book in 2019, advertising it on her web site by saying that she “felt the urge to share her story of divorce, domestic violence and empowerment to support women and men who were unclear of the steps to take after living under the shroud of fear and disappointment.” The website also later advertised a book written by her daughter.
While Clark testified that she had shielded her daughter from the book, Judge Conits held Clark in criminal and civil contempt in 2021, ruling that the book violated several provisions of the divorce decree, including the non-disparagement provision quoted above. Conits sentenced Clark to jail, but suspended the sentence with the condition that she remove the book from sale. The judge also ordered Clark to pay fines totaling $3,500, and her husband’s attorney fees and costs of $10,000.
Addressing the First Amendment issues in barring the book, Judge Conits invoked the “strict scrutiny” test that the U.S. Supreme Court has applied to content-based restrictions on speech and held that this case fulfilled the requirements of that test. “Under the First Amendment,” she wrote, “this court may regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling state interest as long as it chooses the least restrictive means to further that interest, and the Court finds that the current disparagement clause [of the divorce decree] meets that test. … [T]his court has a compelling state interest in limiting Mother’s speech in the best interests of this child. … The court finds that Mother’s book is not constitutionally protected free speech.”
On reconsideration, Judge Conits largely affirmed the earlier ruling, but modified it to allow Clark to disparage her ex-husband in venues “where there exists a reasonable expectation of privacy whereby the child reasonably would not, could not, or should not learn of the same.” The judge also awarded the husband additional attorney fees.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the restraint on the book in a March 5 decision, writing “we agree with the family court that the best interests of Minor Child are a sufficient compelling interest to warrant restricting Mother’s speech; thus, there was no violation of Mother’s rights under the First Amendment.” The court added that “the disparagement provision was narrowly tailored and the least restrictive means to protect the best interests of Minor Child,” and noted that the family court had modified the order to allow Clark to disparage her ex-husband when the daughter would not be exposed to the comments.
While U.S. Supreme Court precedent holds that any prior restraint bears a “heavy presumption against its constitutional validity,” this is not the only time that a South Carolina appeals court has upheld such a restriction on speech. In 1998, a divided South Carolina Supreme Court upheld an order prohibiting television station WIS from publishing a surreptitiously recorded conversation between a murder suspect and his attorney on the grounds that it was necessary to ensure that the defendant received a fair trial. On the other hand, while SCPA Attorney Jay Bender wrote in 2021 about a spate of prior restraints that had recently been imposed by South Carolina trial courts, the South Carolina Supreme Court quickly stayed the two of these orders that were appealed (1, 2).
The upshot is that appellate courts upholding prior restraints is a rare occurrence. But appeals courts will affirm such orders when it perceives a compelling interest to do so, particularly in order to preserve the integrity of a court proceeding or result.
Free Speech Challenges
Freedom of speech and other rights protected by the First Amendment are just some of the elements of the maelstrom of controversy surrounding the actions of the second Trump administration. This is not the first time that politicians have threatened these rights: historical examples include President John Adams’ criminal prosecutions of opponents and critics; suppression of abolitionist literature in the Antebellum period; censorship of the press during the Civil War; the Palmer Raids and other suppression of dissent during World War I; and McCarthyism and the Red Scare during the Cold War. But the First Amendment and the principles it embodies have survived these prior assaults, and at least the initial results in court challenges to the current administration’s actions limiting speech show that these principles still resonate and persist.
A Loss for Wynn, a Win for Sullivan
In the latest affirmation of the New York Times v. Sullivan “actual malice” standard applicable in defamation cases brought by public figures, the U.S. Supreme Court denied review of a libel case brought by casino mogul Steve Wynn in which he argued that the standard is “unfit for the modern era.” There were no reported dissents, even though justices Clarance Thomas and Neil M. Gorsuch have expressed skepticism of the “actual malice” standard. The votes of four justices are required for the court to grant review of a particular case.
Eric P. Robinson is the Reid H. Montgomery Chair in Freedom of Information at the University of South Carolina’s School of Journalism and Mass Communications, where he teaches media and internet law as an associate professor at the USC School of Journalism and Mass Communication, and an academic affiliate of USC’s Joseph F. Rice School of Law. He is “of counsel” at Fenno Law in Charleston / Mount Pleasant. He has worked in media law for more than 30 years and is admitted to legal practice in New York and New Jersey and before the U.S. Supreme Court. This column is for educational purposes only; it does not constitute legal advice. Any opinions are his own, not necessarily those of his employers.
